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Migration and Religion in International law: Research-based Proposals for Inclusive, Resilient, and Multicultural Societies

This focus is the final output of the research project of national interest Migration and Religion in International Law (MiReIL). Research-based Proposals for Inclusive, Resilient, and Multicultural Societies, funded by the Italian Ministry of University and Research and by the European Union – NextGenerationEU in the framework of the “Piano nazionale di ripresa e resilienza (PNRR)”

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WILL FORCED DISPLACED PERSONS DUE TO CLIMATE CHANGES IMPACT ON THE EU LABOR MARKET? USING PREVIOUS RESEARCH STUDIES TO PREDICT THE FUTURE

Denard Veshi*

SUMMARY: 1. Introduction. – 2. Correlation between Migration and Environmental Factors – 3. Correlation between Migration and Labor Market – 3.1. Migration and the Labor Market in the EU Host Country: A General Overview. – 3.2. Migration and the Labor Market in the EU Host Country: Policy Recommendations – 4. Conclusions.

1. Introduction

In recent years, different international and supranational agencies have shown environmental changes. Indeed, according to the World Bank, the acceleration of climate change is threatening biodiversity.¹ In addition, according to the European Environment Agency, it is certain an increase in warmth and a decrease in cold extremes during the 21st century.²

Therefore, the United Nations Environment Assembly, as the world's highest decision-making body on environmental matters, has in recent years undertaken several initiatives aimed at reducing greenhouse gas emissions, advancing the energy transition, and encouraging national legislatures to ratify international agreements – such as the Paris Agreement – or to implement significant domestic measures for environmental protection.³

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¹ World Bank, *Deforestation: Accelerating climate change and threatening biodiversity*, 2023, available at: <https://blogs.worldbank.org/en/opendata/deforestation-accelerating-climate-change-and-threatening-biodiversity>.

² European Environment Agency, *New IPCC report addresses risks of climate change*, 2023, available at: <https://www.eea.europa.eu/highlights/new-ipcc-report-addresses-risks-2>.

³ United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), *Annual Report 2024*, available at: <https://wedocs.unep.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.11822/47082/UNEP-Annual-Report-2024.pdf>.

Environmental changes have also an impact on migration movements. According to the World Bank, in the next 25 years, climate change could force 216 million people to migrate within their own countries, with the highest concentration in the region of Sub-Saharan Africa.⁴ However, a link has been found also in Central Asia.⁵ Quite interestingly, although it is focusing within internal migration, climate factors account between 10%-20% of households' migration decisions.⁶

The correlation between climate changes and migration has also been underlined by different scholars by showing similar results as the previous studies conducted by the World Bank. For instance, climate change will stimulate the migration of more than 143 million people in the Global South by 2050.⁷ However, in the MENA (Middle East and North Africa) region, migration from rural areas to urban centers is often regarded as a measure of last resort, with households typically opting for relocation within national borders rather than across them.⁸

This paper focuses on the correlation between migration into the EU and climate factors since on 23 September 2025, in the UN General Assembly in New York, Donald Trump criticized EU countries' migration and climate policies.⁹ Indeed, he also accused European nations of weakening themselves through immigration and green-energy policies, arguing these harm the developed world economies.¹⁰

The research question addressed in this paper is whether forced displacement caused by climate change will have an impact on the EU labor market. In light of the absence of comprehensive empirical studies specifically examining the effects of climate-induced displacement on labor market dynamics, the analysis proceeds on the following hypothesis: individuals displaced by climate change are to be regarded as migrants from the moment they enter the EU.

Setting aside the definitional ambiguities surrounding persons displaced by climate change – often described in the literature as environmental or climate refugees, environmentally induced migrants, disaster-displaced persons, or more broadly as human mobility in the context of disasters, climate change, and environmental

⁴ World Bank, *Climate change could force 216 million people to migrate within their own countries by 2050*, Press Release, 13 September 2021, available at: <https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2021/09/13/climate-change-could-force-216-million-people-to-migrate-within-their-own-countries-by-2050>.

⁵ United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD), *New study links climate change, land degradation and migration in Central Asia*, available at: <https://www.unccd.int/news-stories/stories/new-study-links-climate-change-land-degradation-and-migration-central-asi>.

⁶ World Bank, *Climate-induced migration in the Middle East and North Africa: What can be done?*, 2023, available at: <https://blogs.worldbank.org/en/peoplemove/climate-induced-migration-mena>.

⁷ A. I. ALMULHIM ET AL., *Climate-Induced Migration in the Global South: An In-Depth Analysis*, in *NPJ Climate Action*, 2024, vol. 3, No. 1, p. 47.

⁸ A. GRANT, N. BURGER, Q. WODON, *Climate-Induced Migration in the MENA Region: Results from the Qualitative Fieldwork*, 2014.

⁹ BBC News, *What rising temperatures mean for global security*, 2025, available at: <https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cg423plexy1o>.

¹⁰ Reuters, *Trump tells UN that climate change is “con job”*, 23 September 2025, available at: <https://www.reuters.com/sustainability/cop/trump-tells-un-that-climate-change-is-con-job-2025-09-23>.

degradation, each entailing distinct normative challenges¹¹ – Section 2 shows that national case-law has, in certain instances, recognized climate-related factors as legally relevant grounds in status determination procedures.¹²

While Section III.1 provides a general overview of the relationship between migration and the labor market, Section III.2 focuses more specifically on policy recommendations. Drawing on the findings of previous studies, the paper then seeks to outline a set of guidelines for assessing and managing the potential effects of future large-scale migration flows, including those driven, at least in part, by climate-related factors. This is fundamental considering also the Regulation (EU) 2024/1359 addressing situations of crisis and *force majeure* in the field of migration and asylum and amending Regulation (EU) 2021/1147, which it shall apply from 1 July 2026.

2. Correlation between Migration and Environmental Factors

In this Section, national case-law underlying the correlation between migration and environmental factors.

Migration remains a highly sensitive and complex issue, particularly in protecting refugee rights. Specifically, in a simplistic manner, when a persecuted individual applies for asylum in another country, they are classified as asylum seekers. If their application is accepted, their status shifts from asylum seeker to asylum migrant. Conversely, if the application is rejected, the individual is typically required to return to their home country. Should they evade deportation, they are considered to be unlawfully residing in the host country. It is important to note that, although the term “illegal migrant” is frequently used in academic and policy discourses, it is legally and ethically problematic to categorize a person as “illegal”.¹³

¹¹ C. SCISSA, *Human Mobility in the Context of Disasters, Climate Change and Environmental Degradation in the Euro-Mediterranean Region: Challenges and Insights*, 2024, pp. 1-51.

¹² Environmental factors, in themselves, do not constitute grounds for the recognition of a protection status. Nonetheless, when assessed cumulatively with other vulnerabilities – such as extreme poverty, lack of access to cultivable land in rural areas, involvement in human trafficking, or membership of particularly vulnerable groups in the country of origin – environmental conditions may significantly contribute to judicial determinations classifying the individual as entitled to protection.

¹³ G. SCHURMANS, *The “Illegal Immigrant”: Constructing an Illegality That (Still) Lies Beneath the Surface*, in *Canadian Journal of Law and Society*, 2015, vol. 30, No. 1, p. 91 s.; G. JEONG, *Contesting the Term “Illegal Migrant”: Political Discourse and the Criminalization of Migration*, in *Discourse & Society*, 2011, vol. 22, No. 2, p. 203 s.; G. FUCHS, *The Role of Language in Constructing the “Illegal Immigrant” in Media and Policy*, in *Journal of Language and Politics*, 2011, vol. 10, No. 3, p. 395 s.; C. GRIFFIN, *Framing the “Illegal” Migrant: Law, Discourse and the Production of Marginality*, in *Social & Legal Studies*, 2011, vol. 20, No. 4, p. 525 s.; N. NOBIL AHMAD, *Ambivalent Inclusions: Anti-Trafficking and Migrant Illegality in Malaysia*, in *International Migration*, 2008, vol. 46, No. 2, p. 141 s.; D. PASPALANOVA, *Undocumented vs. Illegal Migrant: Towards Terminological Coherence*, in *Migraciones Internacionales*, 2008, vol. 4, No. 3, p. 79 s.; S.S. WILLEN, *Exploring “Illegal” and “Irregular” Migrants’ Lived Experiences of Exclusion*, in *International Migration*, 2005, vol. 43, No. 5, p. 77 s.; E. GUILD, *Who Is an Irregular Migrant?*, in *Irregular Migration and Human Rights: Theoretical, European and International Perspectives*, Leiden, 2004, p. 3 s.; M.H. RAM, *Immigration, Illegalization, and the*

Furthermore, some individuals, even if forced to move in another country due to climate reasons, may opt not to seek protection status (refugee, subsidiary protection or, if national protection exists, supplementary protection), thereby forfeiting its protections. Instead, they may enter or remain in a country without a visa or residence permit, placing them as individuals unlawfully present in a foreign state. They might decide for this option due to three main reasons.

First, the probability of being expelled by the State is higher for asylum seekers rather than for illegal immigrants. For example, in the UK, in 2002, 4.7% of illegal immigrants caught by the police were expelled while 11% of Iraqis and 55% of Yugoslavs whose asylum claims had been rejected were removed.¹⁴ According to the last Eurostat data,¹⁵ in 2024, the recognition rate at the EU level – the share of all positive decisions among the total number of first-instance decisions – stood at 51.4%, ranging from less than 10% in Portugal to more than 90% in Estonia.

Secondly, there is a chance in the future that there will be a pardon, or they will be granted clemency, and they will receive a resident permit.¹⁶ For instance, “southern European governments regularly confer legal status to hidden illegal immigrants who stay in the country for a long time.”¹⁷

Third, in some countries – for instance, as it will be explained later, Italy – national protection is given also based on the adaptation in the host country and the strong connection with it. Therefore, foreigners might enter and stay unlawfully until they create a strong connection with the host country. Indeed, according to the recent Eurostat statistics,¹⁸ in 2024, 8.9% of all first-instance decisions granted humanitarian protection, a form of national protection that varies from country to country.

If displaced people due to climate changes apply for protection status, as it is well-known, the protected migrants are part of three groups: refugees, according to international law, subsidiary protection, according to EU law, and, eventually, supplementary national protection.

Focusing on the case of refugee protection, it shall be underlined that the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees of 1951 [from now on, the 1951 Convention] does not

Law, in *Human Rights Quarterly*, 2002, vol. 24, No. 2, p. 437 s.; S. SPENCER, *The Politics of Migration: Managing Opportunity, Conflict and Change*, Oxford, 1992.

¹⁴ J. MONHEIM, *Human Trafficking and the Effectiveness of Asylum Policies*, in *German Working Papers in Law and Economics*, 2008, No. 1, p. 3.

¹⁵ EUROSTAT, *Asylum decisions – annual statistics*, available at: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Asylum_decisions_-_annual_statistics.

¹⁶ In March 2007, Germany’s policymakers reached an agreement to provide residency permits for asylum seekers whose applications were denied in the 1990s but whose deportations have been deferred for some reasons; E. LEISE, *Germany to Regularize ‘Tolerated’ Asylum Seekers*, in *Migration Information Source*, 2007, No. 5.

¹⁷ R. JENNISSEN, L. VAN WISSEN, *The Distribution of Asylum Seekers over Northern and Western European Countries, 1985–2005*, in *Genus*, 2015, vol. 71, No. 1.

¹⁸ EUROSTAT, *Asylum decisions – annual statistics*, cit.

protect “climate” refugees *per se* since there is lack of an individual adverse impact. This is also the position of the UNHCR and IOM.¹⁹

However, it shall be noticed that in the recent years, Courts have taken an evolutionary approach of the interpretation of the 1951 Convention.²⁰ In addition, the OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa includes refugee protection due to natural disasters. Thus, it might be that in the future the 1951 Convention *could also* include protection to “climate” refugees.

Although, as stated above, the 1951 Convention does not protect “climate” refugees *per se*, in some cases – i.e. Tribunal of Florence 16935/2019 of 3 May 2023 – climate changes have been considered fundamental for the chain of events that has led to classify the person as refugee. For clarity purposes, climate changes have led to soil and estate depravation of a Bangladeshi poor farmer from rural area where land is essential. After several attempt to be find job in Bangladesh, he went – by paying a high amount of money that enters in the term of usury – to Romania to work. After the bankruptcy of his employer, he was smuggled in Italy. Thus, victims of smuggling are an identifiable group that enters in the term of “particular social group” of Art. 1(A)(2) of the 1951 Convention.

Quite interestingly, in this legal decision, the Court cited reports from different national (such as the Government of Bangladesh, US Department of State, or Swish Confirmation), regional (such as the Asian Development Bank or European Union Agency for Asylum), and international (such as the Doctors Worldwide, World Health Organization, IMO, World Bank Group, Global Slavery Index, UNHCR, and OECD) organizations. In addition, the decision also cites several academic contributions.²¹

Focusing on the supranational protection, subsidiary protection has been given in several cases where environmental reasons have *also* contributed to the protection status. For instance, in Austria, the subsidiary protection status, established in Section 8 Austrian Asylum Act, is granted when a person would face a real risk of violation of Art. 3 ECHR violation in their country of origin. National courts have argued if this violation shall be done by an actor. While the Austrian Federal Administrative Court

¹⁹ UNHCR, *UNHCR Glossary: Climate Refugees*, available at: <https://www.unhcr.org/glossary>

²⁰ D. VESHI, *The Geneva Convention of 1951: From a Human Rights Perspective to a Law and Economics Approach?*, in *Refugees and the Law in Challenging Times – A Law and Economics Approach*, Cham, 2024, p. 33 s.

²¹ K. RIGA UDET AL., *Groundswell*, Washington, DC, World Bank, 2018, doi: 10.2, p. 94; R. BHARADWAJ ET AL., *Climate-Induced Migration and Modern Slavery*, International Institute for Environment and Development, 2021, p. 12; A. ZIMMERMANN, J. DÖRSCHNER, F. MACHTS (eds.), *The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and Its 1967 Protocol: A Commentary*, Oxford, 2011; A. GRAHLMADSEN, *The Status of Refugees in International Law: Asylum, Entry and Sojourn*, vol. 2, Leyden, 1966; M. RICCA, T. SBRICCOLI, *Shylock del Bengala. Debiti migratori, vite in ostaggio e diritto d’asilo (Un approccio corologico-interculturale alle implicazioni anti-umanitarie del patto commissorio)*, in *Calumet – Intercultural Law and Humanities Review*, 2016, No. 2; A.M.R. MUNIB, *The Effects of Immigration and Resettlement on the Mental Health of South-Asian Communities in Melbourne*, Melbourne, University of Melbourne, Department of Psychiatry, Faculty of Medicine, Dentistry and Health Sciences, 2006.

(BVwG) in November 2018 underlined that this requirement was fundamental,²² in May 2019, the BVwG withdraw its position.²³ Later, also the Austrian Constitutional Court underlined that in the case of beneficiary of subsidiary protection, there is no need that real risk is caused by an actor.²⁴ This approach aims to protect human rights rather than identifying the actor that causes the real risk of violation of Art. 3 ECHR. Furthermore, considering that it is not essential to identify the actor that violates human rights, it seems that also environmental conditions *might* be essential for the subsidiary protection.

In other words, for the Austrian judges “The removal of an alien to the country of origin can also constitute a violation of Art. 3 [ECHR] if the person concerned does not have a livelihood there, i.e. the basic needs of human existence (in relation to the individual case) cannot be met. According to the case law of the ECtHR, such a situation can only be assumed under exceptional circumstances. The mere possibility of a violation of Art. 3 [ECHR] caused by the circumstances of life is not sufficient (...). Rather, in order to substantiate an imminent violation of Art. 3 [ECHR], it is necessary to explain in detail and specifically why such exceptional circumstances exist”²⁵.

Therefore, for instance, environmental conditions – such as droughts in Somalia²⁶ or Afghanistan²⁷ – have been taken into consideration for the determination of the subsidiary protection. However, these environmental factors must be assessed in relation to their impact on the general economic and security conditions of a country, as well as on the family or social network, health situation, employment opportunities and ability to work, and overall living standards. In addition, individual circumstances such as gender, age, education, caregiving responsibilities towards family members, language skills, professional experience, and the availability of family support are also evaluated.

Examples of subsidiary protection granted on environmental grounds can also found in other countries, such as Sweden.²⁸ Following the earthquake of January 2010 in Haiti, the applicant lost her uncle, with whom she had been living. Although her biological father remained in Haiti, she had limited contact with him and his new family. Moreover, he was seriously ill and temporarily residing with other people. In contrast, her mother, stepfather, and half-siblings were Swedish citizens residing in Sweden. The applicant feared that, if returned to Haiti, she would live in tent camps, where sexual violence against homeless girls was reportedly widespread.

²² Austrian Administrative Court (Verwaltungsgerichtshof), judgment of 21 November 2018, Ra 2018/01/0461.

²³ Austrian Administrative Court, judgment of 21 May 2019, Ro 2019/19/0006

²⁴ Austrian Constitutional Court, judgments of 4 December 2019, E1199/2019; 12 December 2019, E2746/2019; 12 December 2019, E1170/2019; and 10 March 2020, E2570/2019.

²⁵ Austrian Administrative Court, judgment of 25 May 2016, Ra 2016/19/0036, emphasis added. See also Austrian Administrative Court, judgments of 17 September 2019, Ra 2019/18/0273; 25 April 2017, Ra 2017/01/0016; 18 October 2018, Ra 2017/19/0200; similarly, 6 November 2009, 2008/19/0174; and 21 August 2001, 2000/01/0443.

²⁶ Austrian Constitutional Court, judgment of 12 December 2019, E1170/2019.

²⁷ Austrian Federal Administrative Court (Bundesverwaltungsgericht), judgment of 19 September 2019, W272 2198119-1.

²⁸ Administrative Court of Stockholm, decision no. UM22726-10 of 6 May 2011.

In this case, environmental conditions were considered a contributing factor to potential exposure to (sexual) violence or other forms of inhuman or degrading treatment. However, the Court also assessed her family ties, both in Haiti (with her father) and in Sweden (with her mother, stepfather, and half-siblings). Interestingly, the applicant herself had not been the direct victim of sexual abuse, although a neighboring girl had suffered such violence. Furthermore, at the time of the decision, country reports indicated that the situation in Haiti had improved since the earthquake. Consequently, the environmental factor appeared to function more as a contextual circumstance – increasing the risk of abuse due to living conditions – rather than as the primary ground for recognizing protection status. As in previous cases, reports from Amnesty International were also taken into consideration by the Court.

Focusing on national protection, this protection is eventual and complementary. Since Italy is, geographically, one of the main countries that will receive a high number of displaced persons due to climate reasons, it should be noted that in the case of supplementary protection in the Italian legal system,²⁹ the national case-law has underlined that the parameters for establishing a connection with Italian territory – or, if preferred, of “rootedness” – are three. The first is family-related, expressed in relation to existing family ties in Italy, including but not limited to marriage, blood relations, or possibly cohabitation. The second is social and translates into the need for an effective integration into Italian society. The third parameter considered by law is the length of the asylum seeker’s stay in the national territory, which represents a concurrent element with presumptive value (of both the uprooting from the country of origin and the rooting in Italy), an element that seems difficult to assess autonomously.³⁰

Furthermore, “for the purpose of recognizing humanitarian protection, a comparative assessment must be carried out between the applicant’s subjective and objective situation in the country of origin and the level of integration achieved in Italy. This comparative evaluation should attribute less weight to the applicant’s conditions in the country of origin as the degree of integration within Italian society increases.”³¹

In the Italian legal cases concerning national supplementary protection, judges also refer to international, supranational, regional, or national reports on climate change. As in cases involving refugees or subsidiary protection, climate factors are considered elements contributing to an individual’s vulnerability, rather than primary grounds for protection *per se*. Such factors are viewed as exacerbating poverty, land scarcity, and

²⁹ The supplementary protection in the Italian legal system has been modified several times. Recently, the Decree-Law No. 130/2020 also expanded the scope of the residence permit for special protection, making it equivalent to the previous residence permit for humanitarian reasons (prior to Decree-Law No. 113/2018). In summary, it provides for a two-year duration, the possibility of renewal, and the option to convert it, upon expiry, into a residence permit for employment purposes. Italian Tribunal of Genova, judgment of 2 December 2024, No. 3133.

³⁰ Court of Cassation, Section VI-1, order of 10 March 2022, No. 7861, which has been cited by various courts such as the Tribunal of Bologna, judgment of 15 March 2024, No. 5749/2023; Tribunal of Catanzaro, decisions of 22 January 2024; 1 February 2024; 2 February 2024; 9 February 2024; 14 February 2024; and 12 March 2024; Tribunal of Genoa, judgment of 2 December 2024, No. 3133.

³¹ Italian Court of Cassation, Joined Civil Sections, judgment of 9 September 2021, No. 24413.

vulnerability in accessing stable or adequately paid employment. In the context of supplementary protection within the Italian legal system, the greater the applicant's degree of integration in the host country, the less weight is accorded to the conditions prevailing in the country of origin.

On the other side, although environmental conditions are considered in various national case-law, in several cases, a considerable body of case law demonstrates judicial reluctance to accept climate-related risks as meeting the requisite legal thresholds, leading to the rejection of claims.³²

To sum up, in all these cases, there is no direct correlation between climate factors and protection status. However, in different decisions, judges have *also* considered the climate and environmental situations in the home countries. It shall be underlined that in all the decisions examined here, reports from national, regional, or international organizations were considered.

3. Correlation between Migration and Labor Market

The importance of migration management in response to climate change has also been recognized at the EU legislative level. In May 2024, the European Union adopted Regulation (EU) 2024/1359 addressing situations of crisis and *force majeure* in the field of migration and asylum and amending Regulation (EU) 2021/1147. This marks the first instance in which the EU has established explicit rules governing migration resulting from natural disasters, which it shall apply from 1 July 2026 (Article 20(2) 2024/1359).

According to Recital 20 of Regulation (EU) 2024/1359, examples of situations of *force majeure* include, among others, pandemics and natural disasters. In addition, according to Article 1(4)(a) of Regulation (EU) 2024/1359, a “crisis” is also defined as a mass arrival of third-country nationals or stateless persons into a Member State. The determination of a mass arrival must take into account factors such as the population, GDP, and geographical characteristics of the Member State, including its territorial size.

The aim of Regulation (EU) 2024/1359 is to introduce derogations from the general rules governing migration management, which are set out in Regulations (EU) 2024/1351 and 2024/1348 (Article 1(1) of Regulation 2024/1359). However, such

³² Among other cases, in Italy, there are these cases: Court of Cassation, Civil Section I, judgments of 21 April 2020, No. 8011; 14 April 2020, No. 7818; and 14 April 2020, No. 7815; Court of Cassation, Civil Section VI, order of 5 February 2020, No. 2749; Court of Appeal of Catanzaro, Section I, judgment of 6 June 2019, No. 1208; Court of Appeal of L'Aquila, Section I, judgment of 10 June 2019, No. 1001; Tribunal of Catanzaro, decisions of 12 January 2024; 17 January 2024; 22 January 2024; and 1 February 2024; Tribunal of Brescia, judgment of 25 September 2024, No. 3833; Court of Appeal of Cagliari, Section II, judgment of 7 October 2022, No. 443; Court of Appeal of Rome, Family Section, judgments of 3 May 2021, No. 3224; 8 June 2021, No. 4106; and 14 June 2021, No. 4289. In addition, among other cases, in Austria, there are these cases: Austrian Federal Administrative Court (Bundesverwaltungsgericht), judgments of 21 November 2018, W231 2130465-1; 17 August 2016, W149 1416847-1; 30 January 2020, W215 2130159-1; and 20 December 2019, W156 2222474-1.

derogations must comply with the principles of necessity and proportionality and may only be applied temporarily in response to an emergency situation. The temporary duration is set at three months, which may be extended to an additional three months (Article 5(1) of Regulation 2024/1359). Furthermore, implementation is continuously monitored at the EU level through the EU Solidarity Coordinator, whose role is to provide technical coordination in implementing the solidarity mechanism for asylum and migration management.

From a procedural standpoint, under Article 2 of Regulation 2024/1359, a Member State that considers itself to be facing a crisis due to migration caused by *force majeure* must submit a reasoned request to the European Commission, providing all relevant information. This includes evidence demonstrating how migration flows have rendered its asylum system non-functional, affected public order and national security, or made it impossible for the State to fulfil its legal obligations. The Member State must also specify the type and level of solidarity requested and the nature of the derogation sought.

Subsequently, the Commission, in close cooperation with the requesting Member State and in consultation with relevant EU agencies and international organisations, such as UNHCR and IOM, and after notifying the European Parliament, the Council, and other Member States, determines whether the conditions outlined in the Regulation have been met. If so, the Commission submits a proposal for a Council implementing decision and informs the European Parliament of that proposal (Article 4 of Regulation 2024/1359).

Based on this background, Section 3.1 examines the correlation between migration and the labor market, while Section 3.2 focuses on policy recommendations. The premises of this section are as follows: first, there is a correlation between environmental degradation and migration, as also highlighted by the EU Regulation of May 2024. Second, there are notable similarities between migrants under international protection – who have been the focus of previous research – and persons displaced by climate change. Indeed, Section 2 of this paper demonstrated that there are several similarities between migrants under protection – who have been the focus of previous research – and persons displaced by climate change. Ultimately, both groups are compelled to leave their home countries. While traditionally displaced persons flee due to persecution (refugees), serious harm (subsidiary protection), or violations of fundamental rights (national supplementary protection), those displaced for climate-related reasons are forced to move because environmental factors severely compromise their fundamental rights and livelihoods. Third, given that environmental migration is a relatively recent phenomenon, there are currently no comprehensive studies assessing the impact of climate-induced forced displacement within EU host countries. Therefore, existing research on the effects of migration on host societies can provide valuable insights into the potential future implications of climate-induced forced displacement across the European Union.

3.1. Migration and the Labor Market in the EU Host Country: A General Overview

This section analyzes the impact of migrants on labor markets in EU host countries, with a focus on unemployment and wage levels. The central assumption is that also protected migrants, like economic migrants, may respond to economic factors.³³

Indeed, the literature has identified that although protected migrants leave their home due to violation of their fundamental human rights, which may be caused *also* by environmental factors, they extract information from agents or smugglers³⁴ and social networks of potential future asylum seekers,³⁵ and former country fellows. Their level of information increases when they cross secure transit countries.³⁶ This has been confirmed in different studies such as in the UK,³⁷ Belgium,³⁸ the Netherlands,³⁹ and Canada.⁴⁰ However, it shall be underlined that they do not conduct a rational choice by comparing all different advantages and disadvantages of various options.⁴¹

Moreover, a recent study published in 2024⁴² showed that protected migrants also respond to economic incentives.⁴³ Some of the economic variables that may influence refugees' decision-making, in addition to the social welfare benefits discussed in the previous section, include GDP per capita, economic growth, and the unemployment rate.⁴⁴

³³ D. VESHI, *The economic integration of immigrants in the European Union: Legal and policy perspectives*, in *European Journal of Migration and Law*, 2024, vol. 26, No. 1, p. 15.

³⁴ K. KOSER, J. PINKERTON, *The Social Networks of Asylum Seekers and the Dissemination of Information about Countries of Asylum*, Home Office, 2002.

³⁵ V. ROBINSON, J. SEGROTT, *Understanding the Decision-Making of Asylum Seekers*, Home Office, 2002; K. KOSER, J. PINKERTON, *The Social Networks of Asylum Seekers and the Dissemination of Information about Countries of Asylum*, cit.

³⁶ T. HAVINGA, A. BÖCKER, *Country of asylum by decision making or by chance: Asylum-seekers in Belgium, the Netherlands and the UK*, in *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 1999, vol. 25, No. 1, pp. 43-61.

³⁷ *Ibid.*

³⁸ *Ibid.*

³⁹ L. DOORNHEIM, N. DIJKHOFF, *Toevlucht zoeken in Nederland (148)*, Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek- en Documentatiecentrum, 1995; M. BRINK, M. PASARIBOE, *Asylum Seekers in the Netherlands*, Instituut voor Sociale Geografie, Universiteit van Amsterdam, 1993; M.E. HULSHOF, L. DE RIDDER, P.J. KROONEMAN, *Asielzoekers in Nederland*, Instituut voor Sociale Geografie, 1992.

⁴⁰ R.F. BARSKY, *Arguing the American Dream à la Canada: Former Soviet Citizens' Justification for Their Decision Making of Host Country*, in *Journal of Refugee Studies*, 1995, vol. 8, No. 2, pp. 125-141; R.F. BARSKY, *Why Canada? Why Québec? Assessing the Convention Refugee's Decision Making of Québec and Canada as Host Country in 1992*, European Centre for the Study of Argumentation, 1994.

⁴¹ H. CRAWLEY, *Chance or Choice? Understanding Why Asylum Seekers Come to the UK*, Refugee Council, 2011; T. HAVINGA, A. BÖCKER, *Country of Asylum by Decision Making or by Chance: Asylum-Seekers in Belgium, the Netherlands and the UK*, cit..

⁴² D. VESHI, *The Different Variables Affecting the Refugees' "Decision" Process*, in *Refugees and the Law in Challenging Times – A Law and Economics Approach*, Cham, 2024, pp. 117-150.

⁴³ M. CZAİKA, *The Political Economy of Refugee Migration*, in *Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik*, 2009, vol. 229, No. 6, pp. 803-824. It should be taken into consideration that, according to E.R. THIELEMANN, there is no association with economic growth rate: E.R. THIELEMANN, *Does Policy Matter? On Governments' Attempts to Control Unwanted Migration*, IIS Discussion Paper No. 9, November 2003, available at SSRN: <https://ssrn.com/abstract=495631> or <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.495631>.

⁴⁴ K. DAY, P. WHITE, *Decision Making or Circumstance: The UK as the Location of Asylum Applications by Bosnian and Somali Refugees*, in *GeoJournal*, 2002, vol. 56, No. 1, pp. 15-26. In contrast: A. GILBERT,

After demonstrating that protected migrants also consider economic variables, their impact on the labor market also depends on the labor model of the host countries. In particular, in a simplified model with two key variables – labor demand and supply – an increase in the labor demand share, such as a rise in the number of foreign job seekers, generates an outward shift in the demand curve. If labor demand and supply are relatively inelastic, wages are likely to decrease while unemployment rates rise. The impact of increased demand driven by foreign labor on host-country labor markets is primarily determined by three variables: (1) the structural characteristics of the host economy; (2) the degree of substitutability between native and protected migrant labor; and (3) labor market elasticity.

First, theoretical models suggest that self-sufficient (autarkic) economies with limited job diversification are more vulnerable to the adverse effects of foreign labor influxes. Here, an increase in labor supply without a corresponding demand increase tends to suppress wages. In contrast, in open economies, the long-term effects on wages may be minimal, though initial increases in unemployment are likely, especially among foreign job seekers competing for similar employment. In such open systems, national and international market adjustments generally mitigate these effects, except in situations of significant disequilibrium.⁴⁵

Second, in diversified economies, the potential negative impact of migration inflows is amplified when migrants can substitute native labor. Such substitutability can exert downward pressure on wages and increase unemployment among local workers. However, when language skills are essential, particularly for skilled jobs, the immediate labor market impact of migrants is often limited, as they may initially concentrate in unskilled roles requiring minimal language proficiency.

Third, rigid labor markets – characterized by low flexibility – tend to be less responsive to migration inflows in terms of wage and employment outcomes.⁴⁶ However, during substantial demand shocks,⁴⁷ such as a sudden, high-volume influx of foreigners, the employment impact may still be pronounced.⁴⁸ Notably, rigid labor markets are often seen as inefficient for local economies. Conversely, in labor markets where both demand and supply are elastic, native employment tends to move in tandem with wage adjustments, and wage fluctuations are generally less pronounced than in scenarios where labor supply is perfectly inelastic.⁴⁹

K. KOSER, *Coming to the UK: What Do Asylum-Seekers Know about the UK before Arrival?*, in *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 2006, vol. 32, No. 7, pp. 1209-1225.

⁴⁵ A.V. DEARDORFF, *The General Validity of the Heckscher-Ohlin Theorem*, in *The American Economic Review*, 1982, vol. 72, No. 4, p. 683.

⁴⁶ R. M. FRIEDBERG, *The Impact of Mass Migration on the Israeli Labor Market*, in *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 2001, vol. 116, No. 4, p. 1373.

⁴⁷ O. BLANCHARD, J. WOLFERS, *The Role of Shocks and Institutions in the Rise of European Unemployment: The Aggregate Evidence*, in *The Economic Journal*, 2000, vol. 110, No. 462, p. C1.

⁴⁸ T. BOERI, P. GARIBALDI, *Are Labor Markets in the New Member States Sufficiently Flexible for EMU?*, in *Journal of Banking & Finance*, 2006, vol. 30, No. 5, p. 1393.

⁴⁹ R.M. FRIEDBERG, *The Impact of Mass Migration on the Israeli Labor Market*, in *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, cit.

Empirical studies on the impact of migrants on national labor markets yield varying conclusions, with no consensus on a definitive effect. The majority of studies reviewed suggest that an increase in the migrant labor share does not exert a broadly negative impact on the host country's labor market. For instance, research conducted in Britain (1973–1983),⁵⁰ Germany (1985–1989),⁵¹ the EU (1983–1999),⁵² Spain (late 1990s),⁵³ and Italy (1980–1995)⁵⁴ indicates that migrants and native workers are generally imperfect substitutes. This imperfect substitutability mitigates potential competition between migrant and native labor.⁵⁵

However, some studies offer divergent findings. For example, research on the Italian labor market (1986–1995) suggests that when migrants comprise a limited share of the population, they may complement unskilled native workers, potentially driving wage increases within this group.⁵⁶ Conversely, other studies underscore the potential adverse impacts of immigration on labor market outcomes.⁵⁷ These effects appear in several forms: migrant workers may challenge the employment prospects of young natives with limited experience;⁵⁸ regions with high recent migrant inflows can become less attractive to unskilled native workers;⁵⁹ and migrants may exert downward pressure on wages or diminish job opportunities for competing native workers.⁶⁰

Additionally, studies focusing on undocumented migrants often report similar outcomes, where unauthorized immigrant labor may reduce wages and restrict employment opportunities for natives, particularly in unskilled occupations. These

⁵⁰ C. DUSTMANN ET AL., *The Impact of Immigration on the British Labor Market*, in *The Economic Journal*, 2005, vol. 115, p. F324.

⁵¹ J.S. PISCHKE, J. VELLING, *Employment Effects of Immigration to Germany: An Analysis Based on Local Labor Markets*, in *Review of Economics and Statistics*, 1997, vol. 79, No. 4, p. 594.

⁵² J. D. SNGRIST, A.D. KUGLER, *Protective or Counter-productive? Labor Market Institutions and the Effect of Immigration on EU Natives*, in *The Economic Journal*, 2003, vol. 113, No. 488, p. F302.

⁵³ R. CARRASCO ET AL., *The Effect of Immigration on the Labor Market Performance of Native-Born Workers: Some Evidence for Spain*, in *Journal of Population Economics*, 2008, vol. 21, No. 3, p. 627.

⁵⁴ A. VENTURINI, *Do Immigrants Working Illegally Reduce the Natives' Legal Employment? Evidence from Italy*, in *Journal of Population Economics*, 1999, vol. 12, No. 1, p. 135.

⁵⁵ D. CARD, *Immigration and Inequality*, NBER Working Paper No. 14683, National Bureau of Economic Research, 2009.

⁵⁶ A. VENTURINI, C. VILLOSIO, *Labor Market Effects of Immigration into Italy: An Empirical Analysis*, in *International Labour Review*, 2006, vol. 145, Nos. 1-2, p. 91.

⁵⁷ J. G. ALTONJI, D. CARD, *The Effects of Immigration on the Labor Market Outcomes of Less-Skilled Natives*, in J. M. ABOWD, R.B. FREEMAN (eds.), *Immigration, Trade, and the Labor Market*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1991, p. 201; J.J. DOLADO ET AL., *The Effects of Migration on the Relative Demand of Skilled versus Unskilled Labor: Evidence from Spain*, CEPR Discussion Papers, No. 1476, 1996; J. J. DOLADO, A. GORIA, A. ICHINO, *Immigration and the Labor Market: Collective Bargaining, Wages, and Economic Performance*, in T. BOERI, G. HANSON, B. MCCORMICK (eds.), *Immigration Policy and the Welfare System*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005, p. 213; C. DUSTMANN ET AL., *The Impact of Immigration on the British Labor Market*, cit.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

⁵⁹ R. FILER, *The Effect of Immigrant Arrivals on Migratory Patterns of Native Workers*, in G. J. BORJAS, R. B. FREEMAN (eds.), *Immigration and the Workforce: Economic Consequences for the United States and Source Areas*, Chicago, 1992.

⁶⁰ G.J. BORJAS, *The Labor Demand Curve Is Downward Sloping: Reexamining the Impact of Immigration on the Labor Market*, in *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 2003, vol. 118, No. 4, p. 1335.

findings illustrate the complex and nuanced effects that migrant labor may have on host-country labor markets, highlighting the importance of context, labor market structure, and policy in shaping outcomes.⁶¹

The systematic literature review indicates that migrants may negatively affect national labor markets when they function as perfect substitutes for native workers or when external factors lead to diminished expectations among migrants. First, in situations where migrants are perfect substitutes for native labor—particularly in unskilled positions that require minimal qualifications or jobs without the need for language skills (e.g., in artistic fields where communication occurs through non-verbal means)—they can influence labor demand by reducing job availability and exerting downward pressure on wages. Second, undocumented migrants, or those unlawfully residing in host countries, often accept wages that fall below market value when such employment opportunities arise. This phenomenon is particularly evident in sectors that require unskilled labor. Similar effects are observed among asylum seekers whose claims for refugee status are denied but who remain in the country, as well as individuals who falsely assert persecution claims.

While protected migrants may respond to economic incentives, they fundamentally differ from economic migrants. A comprehensive review of existing literature on the foreign labor stock in EU countries indicates that the overall impact of protected migrants on national labor markets is generally minimal.⁶² This limited effect can be attributed to compensatory dynamics arising from both internal,⁶³ and international migration.⁶⁴ Notably, a more pronounced impact is observed in unskilled jobs within the same ethnic communities,⁶⁵ suggesting that the presence of migrants can differentially

⁶¹ D.B. BEAN ET AL., *Undocumented Mexican Immigrants and the Earnings of Other Workers in the United States*, in *Demography*, 1988, vol. 25, No. 1, p. 35; S. DJAJIĆ, *Illegal Immigration and Resource Allocation*, in *International Economic Review*, 1997, vol. 38, No. 1, p. 97; T.P. LIANOS ET AL., *Illegal Immigration and Local Labor Markets: The Case of Northern Greece*, in *International Migration*, 1996, vol. 34, No. 3, p. 449; A. H. SARRIS, S. ZOGRAFAKIS, *A Computable General Equilibrium Assessment of the Impact of Illegal Immigration on the Greek Economy*, in *Journal of Population Economics*, 1999, vol. 12, No. 1, p. 155; J.L. SIMON ET AL., *The Economic Consequences of Immigration*, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1999.

⁶² D. VESHI, *The Recognition of the Right to Healthcare to Irregular Immigrants: A Comparative Study of Expanding Human Rights in the European Union*, in *International Journal of Human Rights*, 2020, vol. 24, Nos. 2-3, p. 187.

⁶³ G.J. BORJAS, *The Wage Impact of the Marielitos: Additional Evidence*, National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No. w21850, 2016; G.J. BORJAS, *The Wage Impact of the Marielitos: A Reappraisal*, in *ILR Review*, 2017, vol. 70, No. 5, p. 1077; D. CARD, *The Impact of the Mariel Boatlift on the Miami Labor Market*, in *ILR Review*, 1990, vol. 43, No. 2, p. 245; G. PERI, V. YASENOV, *The Labor Market Effects of a Refugee Wave: Applying the Synthetic Control Method to the Mariel Boatlift*, National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No. 21801, 2015.

⁶⁴ J. HUNT, *The Impact of the 1962 Repatriates from Algeria on the French Labor Market*, in *Industrial and Labor Relations Review*, 1992, vol. 45, p. 556.

⁶⁵ J. D. ANGRIST, A. D. KUGLER, *Protective or Counter-productive? Labor Market Institutions and the Effect of Immigration on EU Natives*, in *The Economic Journal*, 2003, vol. 113, No. 488, p. F302; G. J. BORJAS, *The Wage Impact of the Marielitos: Additional Evidence*, cit.; G. J. BORJAS, *The Wage Impact of the Marielitos: A Reappraisal*, cit., p. 1077; D. CARD, *The Impact of the Mariel Boatlift on the Miami*

affect various demographic groups.⁶⁶ Specifically, individuals with similar skill sets may experience adverse effects, whereas those with complementary skills may benefit from their inclusion.⁶⁷

3.2. Migration and the Labor Market in the EU Host Country: Policy Recommendations

Following the theoretical exploration of the foreign labor stock in EU countries, it is crucial to offer policy recommendations that enhance formal market access for protected migrants.

This strategy is significant for three primary reasons. First, informal employment tends to contribute less to the fiscal health of host countries and primarily demands low-skilled labor.⁶⁸ Consequently, protected migrants engaged in informal work often yield lower economic contributions while still accessing social benefits. Second, formal employment enhances the bargaining power of migrants, enabling them to negotiate wages more effectively and advocate for equitable compensation.⁶⁹ This increased bargaining power can mitigate the adverse impacts on job opportunities for local workers possessing similar skill sets. Third, the New York Declaration for Migration and Refugees, adopted in 2016, encourages host governments to consider the opening of their labor markets to protected migrants, underscoring the necessity for inclusive labor policies.⁷⁰

The effectiveness of this strategy is contingent upon the socio-economic conditions of the host country and the skill levels of the refugees involved. Consequently, the integration strategy can be delineated into general guidelines and specific regulations tailored to particular job sectors.

Regarding general guidelines, it is essential to align the skills of protected migrants with the labor market's needs.⁷¹ First, by addressing labor shortages, protected migrants can positively influence the productivity of local industries.⁷² However, it is advisable to distribute protected migrants across diverse communities, avoiding high

Labor Market, cit., p. 245; G. PERI, V. YASENOV, *The Labor Market Effects of a Refugee Wave: Applying the Synthetic Control Method to the Mariel Boatlift*, cit.

⁶⁶ B.E. WHITAKER, *Changing Opportunities: Refugees and Host Communities in Western Tanzania*, UNHCR Working Paper No. 11, 1999, available at: <https://www.unhcr.org/3ae6a0c70.pdf>.

⁶⁷ J.-F. MAYSTADT, P. VERWIMP, *Winners and Losers among a Refugee-Hosting Population*, in *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, 2014, vol. 62, No. 4, p. 769.

⁶⁸ R. LA PORTA, A. SHLEIFER, *Informality and Development*, in *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 2014, vol. 28, No. 3, p. 109.

⁶⁹ B. HIRSCH, E. J. JAHN, *Is There Monopsonistic Discrimination against Immigrants?*, in *ILR Review*, 2015, vol. 68, No. 3, p. 501.

⁷⁰ United Nations, *New York Declaration*, 2016, available at: <https://refugeesmigrants.un.org/declaration>.

⁷¹ L. WOENNMANN, *Ifo Economist Woessmann Calls for Systematic Registration of Education Levels of Refugees*, CESifo Institute, Technical Report, 2015.

⁷² A. M. CLEMENS, *The Effect of Occupational Visas on Native Employment: Evidence from Labor Supply to Farm Jobs in the Great Recession*, IZA Discussion Paper No. 10492, 2017.

concentrations that may foster competition for jobs among local workers, particularly in instances where skill sets overlap.⁷³

Second, providing language acquisition programs is vital, as these facilitate the adaptation process and expedite protected ' access to the national labor market. Rapid integration into the workforce is associated with long-term success,⁷⁴ resulting in increased consumption⁷⁵ and contributing to the formalization of the job market.⁷⁶

More specific recommendations can also be identified. First, for protected migrants with high skill levels, professional organizations should be engaged in recognizing and validating migrants' credentials, thereby facilitating their entry into high-level employment.⁷⁷ This approach can also mitigate screening costs, a significant barrier in the current labor market.⁷⁸

Second, protected migrants with entrepreneurial ambitions should receive support in establishing new businesses within the host country. Economic theory posits that increased competition can incentivize existing firms to enhance their innovation and productivity, yielding broader economic benefits.⁷⁹

By implementing these recommendations, host countries can effectively harness the potential of protected migrants, facilitating their integration into the labor market while simultaneously promoting economic growth and social cohesion.

4. Conclusion

An examination of contemporary empirical studies on the effects of protected migrants on labor markets underscores the significant impact that migration influxes have on host countries. Although these studies draw upon earlier research, their underlying premise is that migrants leaving their home countries for environmental reasons form part of the broader category of migrants. Consequently, their behavior and integration dynamics resemble those of both regular and irregular migrants.

⁷³ S. BRAUN, T.O. MAHMOUD, *The Employment Effects of Immigration: Evidence from the Mass Arrival of German Expellees in Postwar Germany*, in *Journal of Economic History*, 2014, vol. 74, No. 1, p. 69; G. J. BORJAS, J. MONRAS, *The Labor Market Consequences of Refugee Supply Shocks*, in *Economic Policy*, 2017, vol. 32, No. 91, p. 361; A.M. CLEMENS, *The Effect of Occupational Visas on Native Employment: Evidence from Labor Supply to Farm Jobs in the Great Recession*, IZA Discussion Paper No. 10492, 2017.

⁷⁴ M. MARBACH ET AL., *The Long-Term Impact of Employment Bans on the Economic Integration of Refugees*, in *Science Advances*, 2018, vol. 4, No. 9, p. eaap9519.

⁷⁵ F.M. FASANI ET AL., *Illegal Migration and Consumption Behavior of Immigrant Households*, IZA Discussion Papers No. 10029, 2016.

⁷⁶ M. EL-ZOGHBI ET AL., *The Role of Financial Services in Humanitarian Crises*, Washington, World Bank, 2017.

⁷⁷ G.S. BASRAN, L. ZONG, *Devaluation of Foreign Credentials as Perceived by Visible Minority Professional Immigrants*, in *Canadian Ethnic Studies Journal*, 1998, vol. 30, No. 3, p. 6.

⁷⁸ P. LUNDBORG, P. SKEDINGER, *Employer Attitudes toward Refugee Immigrants: Findings from a Swedish Survey*, in *International Labour Review*, 2016, vol. 155, No. 2, p. 315.

⁷⁹ P. AGHION ET AL., *Industrial Policy and Competition*, in *American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics*, 2015, vol. 7, No. 4, p. 1.

Judicial practice reflects this complexity. In several cases, environmental factors have been deemed fundamental grounds for granting protection, whether in the form of refugee status, subsidiary protection, or national complementary protection. However, other rulings demonstrate that climate-related factors, though raised as a basis for protection, have been dismissed by the courts.

Looking ahead, the number of individuals seeking protection in EU countries is likely to increase. Europe's geographical proximity to the MENA region – a territory highly vulnerable not only to armed conflicts but also to the adverse effects of climate change – suggests that future protection claims may increasingly invoke environmental grounds. Indeed, Regulation (EU) 2024/1359, which will apply from 1 July 2026, introduces the possibility for EU Member States to adopt derogations, under strict EU supervision, in cases of natural disasters that result in a substantial influx of migrants.

Against this backdrop, by drawing on previous empirical findings, the present research seeks to assist policymakers in developing sustainable legal and policy responses to anticipated migration flows driven, at least in part, by climate-related factors.

The interaction between migration inflows and labor market dynamics in EU host countries is multifaceted and contingent on a range of economic, legal, and social variables. While protected migrants may exhibit behavior similar to that of economic migrants, their overall impact on labor markets is nuanced. Empirical evidence suggests that their effects are generally limited and often concentrated in low-skilled sectors, where imperfect substitutability with native workers mitigates broader market disruptions. However, under specific conditions – such as in rigid labor markets, autarkic economies, or when migrants are perfect substitutes for native labor – adverse outcomes like wage suppression and heightened unemployment may materialize.

To maximize the potential of protected migrants' integration while safeguarding host-country labor markets, policy interventions must balance inclusivity with economic pragmatism. This entails facilitating access to formal employment, investing in language and skill-recognition programs, and promoting entrepreneurship among protected migrants. Such measures not only enhance self-sufficiency of protected migrants and their social cohesion but also contribute to host-country economic resilience. Ultimately, a differentiated and evidence-based approach is essential for effective labor market integration in the third millennium.

ABSTRACT: This paper examines the potential impact of climate-induced displacement on EU host countries, with a particular focus on the labor market implications. It reviews key national case law addressing the protection of climate-displaced persons, distinguishing between substantiated claims and unfounded applications. Building upon existing scholarship on migration and EU labor markets, the paper investigates how future displacement driven by climate change

may affect labor dynamics across the Union. Finally, it proposes targeted policy measures aimed at fostering fair and effective integration of climate-displaced persons into the EU's socioeconomic framework.

KEYWORDS: labor market – EU – migration impact – empirical studies – migration crisis.